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I would like to start by acknowledging and thanking the Algonquin Nation, on 
whose unceded territory we are meeting. 
 
When the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867 by the UK Parliament, the 
BNA Act gave the Parliament of Canada exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for the Indians”.  Parliament used this authority to enact the Indian 
Act in 1876.  That statute gave the Canadian government the power to impose the 
band council system on First Nations without their consent. 
 
The governance authority of First Nation band councils is therefore delegated 
authority – it comes from the Indian Act and applies only on reserves.  Band 
councils as such have no jurisdiction over First Nations’ traditional territories 
beyond the boundaries of reserves. 
 
Of course First Nations had their own governments and laws that the Canadian 
government tried to replace with the Indian Act system and Canadian law.  
Indigenous governance and laws existed before Europeans arrived in North 
America and continued after that.  They were not extinguished by colonization and 
the Indian Act, but the Canadian government did attempt to repress them by 
imposition of the band council system and other oppressive measures, such as 
outlawing the potlatch and sun dance and establishing residential schools.  
 
Regarding land rights, after decades of unsuccessful efforts to have their rights 
respected, First Nations in British Columbia planned to go to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in England, the court of final appeal for the British 
Empire.  The Parliament of Canada reacted by enacting an amendment to the 
Indian Act in 1927 making it illegal for anyone to raise or pay money to pursue any 
Indian claims.  This is how oppressive things were.  But the First Nations did not 
give in.  In many cases they went underground and continued to practice their 
governance, ceremonies, and laws. 
 
Some of the more repressive provisions in the Indian Act were removed in 1951, 
and status Indians got the right to vote in federal elections in 1960.  During the 
1960s, First Nations people became more organized politically, especially in 
opposition to the federal government’s infamous 1969 White Paper.  The Supreme 
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Court of Canada also began to acknowledge Aboriginal rights and title in 
important decisions, such as Calder (1973) and Guerin (1984). 
 
But the watershed event was the inclusion of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 
1982.  First Nations people have always maintained that the Aboriginal and treaty 
rights recognized and affirmed by this section include the inherent right of self-
government.  During the constitutional conferences on Aboriginal and treaty rights 
during the 1980s, some of the provincial governments in particular refused to 
acknowledge this. 
 
In 1995, the federal government did accept that First Nations have an inherent right 
of self-government, but the government still regarded it as contingent.  For it to be 
implemented, negotiations had to take place and the federal and provincial 
governments had to agree on its parameters. 
 
In my opinion, this contingent approach to the inherent right is inconsistent with 
section 35.  I think what that section did was finally acknowledge in the Canadian 
constitution that Indigenous peoples are partners in Confederation, as concluded by 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.  Section 35 created the 
constitutional space, not only for treaty rights, land rights, resource rights, and so 
on, but also for Indigenous governance.  
 
In other words, section 35 acknowledges the constitutional authority of Indigenous 
peoples to govern themselves and their territories, just as sections 91 and 92 of the 
original BNA Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867) provide the federal and 
provincial governments with governance authority.  But unlike federal and 
provincial powers, Indigenous governance authority does not come from the 
Canadian constitution.  The Indigenous right of self-government is inherent, 
meaning that it comes from the fact that the First Nations were sovereign, 
independent nations prior to European colonization. This right is not contingent – it 
does not depend on or require the permission of the federal and provincial 
governments in order for it to be exercised. 
 
 So how have Canadian courts dealt with the inherent right of self-government?  In 
my respectful opinion, in a rather confused and inadequate manner.  The only case 
where the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with this matter directly is the 
unfortunate Pamajewon decision in 1996.  In that case, two First Nations in 
Ontario claimed an Aboriginal right to govern their reserve lands, including a right 
to operate and regulate gaming activities.  
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I don’t want to criticize these First Nations and their legal counsel, but from a 
strategic perspective a gambling case was not a good choice to take to the Supreme 
Court on the inherent right of self-government.  It risked setting a bad precedent, 
and that is what happened because the Court was not sympathetic.  It denied that 
these First Nations any right of self-government over gambling. 
 
But the real problem with Pamajewon is the way the Court reached its decision.  
Chief Justice Lamer applied the Van der Peet test and said that, to have a right to 
self-government over high-stakes gambling, the First Nations had to prove that 
gambling, and the regulation of it, were practices, customs, and traditions integral 
to their distinctive cultures at the time of contact with Europeans.   This, of course, 
imposes an impossible burden of proof in most cases.  It is also piece-meal – each 
First Nation has to meet this test for each activity it claims a right of self-
government over. 
 
This is really an empty box approach to the section 35 right of self-government.  
The right is acknowledged in principle, but it has no content until governance 
authority over specific activities is proven on this piece-meal basis. 
 
This approach can be compared with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, which has acknowledged the inherent right of self-government 
of the Indian nations since the 1830s.  Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v. 
Georgia (1832) in particular, acknowledged that the Indigenous nations were 
completely sovereign prior to European colonization. 
 
That sovereignty continued after colonization and the creation of the United States.  
According to Marshall C.J., it was diminished by European acquisition of 
sovereignty, but the Indian nations retained full authority over their internal affairs 
and their territories that were not surrendered by treaty or taken by conquest. 
 
However, Indian sovereignty can be limited by Congress because it is not protected 
by the US Constitution, unlike the inherent right of self-government in Canada that 
has been constitutionally protected by section 35 since 1982. 
 
The lesson to learn from the United States is that the governance authority of the 
Indian nations is presumed to consist of a full box of powers, with one exception – 
in external affairs, they can deal only with the United States government.  They 
can’t deal with foreign nations or alienate their lands to private persons. 
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Apart from that exception, the starting point in the US is acknowledgement that the 
Indian nations have a full range of governmental powers.  So the onus of proof is 
on the United States government if it contends that their right of self-government 
has been diminished in some way, which could have occurred as a result of treaties 
or Acts of Congress. 
 
This is the opposite of the approach in Pamajewon, where the onus is on First 
Nations to prove each of their self-government rights individually.  The 
Pamajewon decision has not been overruled, but I doubt that it will be followed in 
future cases.  It is inconsistent with Indigenous peoples’ own perspectives on their 
right of self-government, which the Supreme Court has said have to be taken into 
account.  It is also inconsistent with the Trudeau government’s acknowledgment of 
the right of self-government and its commitment to implement the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  In addition, it does not take account of the 
communal nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the need for governmental 
structures to make collective decisions regarding those rights, as was held by 
Justice Williamson in Campbell v. British Columbia (BCSC, 2000). 
 
So I think the inherent right of self-government is a full box of powers that First 
Nations can use to govern themselves and their lands without anyone else’s 
permission.  But what if this exercise of jurisdiction comes into conflict with 
federal and provincial laws? 
 
My view is that Indigenous laws in relation to their citizens and territories 
generally take precedence over federal and provincial laws because Indigenous 
governments and laws are protected by the constitutional space provided by section 
35.  In constitutional terms, this means Indigenous laws should be paramount. 
 
However, there is an exception.  The Supreme Court has said that federal and 
provincial legislation can infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights – and this would 
include the right of self-government – if they can justify the infringement using the 
Sparrow test.  Nonetheless, I think the bar for justifying infringements is quite 
high.  If, for example, a First Nation has its own laws regulating use of its 
Aboriginal title lands in accordance with its own traditions and values, how could 
the application of conflicting provincial laws be justified? 
 
It is therefore vital for First Nations to exercise their inherent right of self-
government by having their own laws in place, which can include traditional laws 
and new laws created through the exercise of their inherent governmental 
authority.  Otherwise, federal and provincial laws will likely apply by default. 
 5 
 
Further Readings 
 
Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on 
R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29 Alberta Law Review 498 
John Borrows, “Unextinguished: Rights and the Indian Act” (2016) 67 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 3 
_____, “Revitalizing Canada’s Indigenous Constitution: Two Challenges”, in UNDRIP 
Implementation: Braiding International, Domestic and Indigenous Laws, Special Report 
(Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017), 20, 
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/undrip-implementation-braiding-international-domestic-and-
indigenous-laws 
Gordon Christie, “‘Obligations’, Decolonization and Indigenous Rights to Governance” (2014) 
27 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 259 
_____, “Indigenous Legal Orders, Canadian Law and UNDRIP”, in UNDRIP Implementation: 
Braiding International, Domestic and Indigenous Laws, Special Report (Waterloo: Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, 2017), 48, https://www.cigionline.org/publications/undrip-
implementation-braiding-international-domestic-and-indigenous-laws 
Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University 
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012) 
_____, “Back to the Future: Reconciliation and Indigenous Sovereignty after Tsilhqot’in” (2016) 
67 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 109 
 
Kent McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringements of the Inherent Aboriginal Right of Self-
Government” (2003) 22 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 329 
_____, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (West Vancouver: National 
Centre for First Nations Governance, 2007), online: Osgoode Digital Commons, and 
http://fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/kent_mcneil.pdf 
 
_____,“Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal 
Coherence”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, & Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: 
Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007), 129 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-
Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) 
 
Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 
35 (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 2003) 
